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Section 1. Introduction
Economists have written extensively about market approaches to environmental
externalities including emissions taxes and permit trading programs. Coase (1960), Dales
(1968), Montgomery (1972), Tietenberg (1985), and Baumol and Oates (1988), for
instance, provide arguments for such approaches. Relative to rigid regulatory approaches
such as technology mandates, market approaches allow individual firms to determine
their own abatement strategies. When marginal abatement costs vary across firms, the
flexibility of a permit trading program leads to cost savings over technology mandates.
Moreover, in principle, permit trading minimizes the total abatement cost of achieving a
specified emissions target. A permit trading program has the added bonus of prompting
new competition among previously independent abatement technology industries
resulting in subsequent reductions in abatement costs (Rezek and Blair, 2005). 1
The promise of achieving low cost greenhouse gas abatement has brought the
concept of carbon dioxide (CO2) permit trading to the forefront of international
discussions on climate change. Recent proposals for greenhouse gas allowance trading
programs include those in Europe, a small number of U.S. states, and voluntary corporate
programs. The perceived success of the U.S. market for sulfur dioxide (SO2) and
nitrogen oxide (NOx) in the electric utility industry, established under Title IV of the
1990 Clean Air Act Amendments, has both motivated and heavily influenced the design
of proposed CO2 trading programs.
To be sure, climate change is a real concern of the international community. The
Kyoto Protocol serves as the key international policy instrument to reduce greenhouse
gases. Under the agreement, which was negotiated in December 1997 and became
1

For more on the economics of permit trading, please see Section 2 A.
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effective on February 16, 2005 following ratification by Russia in November 2004,
collective emissions are to be reduced to 5.2 percent below 1990 levels between 2008 and
2012. Country-specific targets range from 8 percent in the European Union and 7 percent
in the U.S. to 0 percent in Russia. If greenhouse gas emissions increase or reductions fail
to meet targets, countries may participate in a permit trading market. In all, 163 countries
have ratified the protocol, though notable exceptions include the U.S. and Australia. In
addition to the Kyoto Protocol, in June 2005 the science academies of 11 countries,
including the U.S., Brazil, Canada, China, France, Germany, India, Italy, Japan, Russia,
and the United Kingdom, issued a joint statement on global climate change. The
statement warns that climate change is real and that human activity is the driving force
behind recent changes in the Earth’s climate (EIA 2005).
Carbon is an element commonly found in vast quantities in the atmosphere, soil,
carbonate rocks such as limestone, and dissolved ocean water. Records from Antarctic
ice cores reveal that the “carbon cycle” has been imbalanced for some 200 years, with a
surplus of carbon accumulating in the atmosphere faster than the natural environment can
sequester it. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change estimates that before 1750
atmospheric carbon concentration rested at 280 ± 10 parts per million. Today
concentration levels are at 374.9 parts per million (IPCC 2001).
The U.S. Energy Information Agency (EIA) estimates that U.S. energy-related
carbon dioxide emissions in 2002 totaled 5,746 million metric tons (MMT), or about 24
percent of the world total. In 2000 the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
estimates that energy-related activities accounted for 85 percent of U.S. total
anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions on a carbon equivalent basis, and was
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specifically responsible for 97 percent of CO2 emissions (EPA 2002). Moreover, the
EPA found that electric utility industry fossil fuel combustion accounted for 39 percent of
national anthropogenic CO2 emissions in 2000, consuming 34 percent of U.S. energy
from fossil fuels and making the electric utility industry the largest economic sector
producing CO2 emissions (EPA 2001, 2005). In addition, the EPA reports that CO2 from
fossil fuel combustion accounted for a nearly constant 79 percent of global warming
potential (GWP) weighted emissions from 1990 to 2000, making it the single largest
source of U.S. greenhouse gas emissions. Overall, approximately 85 percent of energy
consumed in the U.S. is produced from fossil fuels (EPA 2001).
Given that the electric utility industry is responsible for the largest portion of
domestic greenhouse gas emissions, that CO2 represents a dominant share of these
emissions, and that economic theory suggests a tradable permit approach minimizes
aggregate abatement costs, a national CO2 tradable permit market for emissions from
electric utility plants offers a legitimate policy option for curbing carbon emissions in the
U.S. This paper endeavors to shed light on how a tradable CO2 permit market might take
shape by analyzing plant-level marginal abatement costs. Specifically, the “shadow
price” for a ton of CO2 is identified through a linear programming model, where the
shadow price represents the opportunity cost of abatement (in terms of lost revenue) and
therefore serves as a proxy for marginal abatement cost.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the
economic rationale of trading programs and outlines existing allowance trading programs
including the Acid Rain Reduction program developed under the 1990 Clean Air Act
Amendments, as well as various CO2 programs in Europe and the United States. Section
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2 also reviews approaches for estimating shadow prices. Section 3 presents the model
used to identify CO2 shadow prices in this paper. Section 4 describes the data and
procedure used to calculate shadow prices. Section 5 provides the results and
interpretation of this model. Finally, Section 6 offers conclusions and suggestions for
future research.

Section 2. Prior Research on Allowance Trading Programs and Shadow Prices

2.1 Utilizing a Property Rights Approach to Curb Externalities: Increasing Economic
Efficiency through Permit Trading
Traditionally, government regulation targeting pollution has sought to uniformly
control emissions among polluters. This approach, known as “command and control”
(CAC), ultimately imposes a “one-size fits all” set of rules on emissions sources, though
these rules may take on any number of forms. For instance, a regulation may impose a
uniform standard of emissions per kilowatt hour at electric utility plants, or it may require
the use of a particular abatement technology such as a scrubber on a smokestack. A
major criticism of the CAC approach is that a uniform standard is too rigid and may not
represent the least cost abatement strategy for the firm, resulting in a potential efficiency
loss given the set of abatement opportunities that could otherwise be pursued. To achieve
overall minimum abatement costs, each firm must abate to the point where marginal
abatement costs are equalized across firms. As a result, rigid technology standards
potentially engender an inefficient abatement scheme by forcing the adoption of a
technology with varying levels of implementation costs between firms. Thus, marginal
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abatement costs may differ for each firm, meaning that overall costs have not been
minimized. This leads to a loss of economic efficiency, as the prescribed quantity of
emissions could be reduced at a lower cost through each firm utilizing its own most
efficient abatement option.
The concept of permit trading emerged as an alternative to CAC in the early
1970s (Stavins 2003). Under a permit trading scheme, the regulator selects an aggregate
emissions target, and a number of permits equal to targeted emissions are distributed to
polluting firms covered by the program. These permits may then be traded between
firms, as firms with higher marginal abatement costs will find it beneficial to purchase
permits from firms with lower marginal abatement costs. Stavins writes that, in theory, if
properly designed and implemented, market-based instruments allow any desired level of
pollution cleanup to be realized at the lowest overall cost to society, by providing
incentives for the greatest reductions in pollution by those firms that can achieve the
reductions most cheaply. That is, firms that can reduce pollution cheaply are willing and
able to sell excess permits to those firms facing steeper marginal abatement costs.
Furthermore, this market flexibility ultimately results in aggregate abatement being
achieved at lowest overall cost. That is, the initial reduction of emissions is shifted from
all firms—including firms with high abatement costs—to firms with low marginal
abatement costs, reducing the overall cost of reducing emissions. Figure 1 below
illustrates the relationship between permits and a firm’s marginal abatement cost (MAC).
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Figure 1. Firm Level Equilibrium of Marginal Abatement Cost and Permits 2

On the X-axis is the level of emissions for a firm and the number of permits
owned by the firm. On the Y-axis is the marginal abatement cost for reducing emissions
by one unit at the given level of emissions as well as the market price for permits. In the
region to the right of E0 MAC is less than p0, the permit market price. As a result, it is
cheaper for the firm to reduce emissions rather than purchase a permit for each unit of
emissions in excess of E0. However, in the region to the left of E0 MAC is greater than
p0. Consequently, it is cheaper for the firm to purchase a permit for each unit of
emissions below E0 rather than reduce emissions further. Thus, the firm will emit E0
units of emissions, is the point where p0 equals MAC. Accordingly, the firm will
purchase q0 permits and will always end up emitting at E0 regardless of the initial permit
endowment.
This approach allows each individual firm to pursue its own least-cost strategy for
reducing emissions. Note that a CAC approach could match the cost savings of a permit

2

John Stranlund. Course Lecture Notes. “Natural Resource and Environmental Economics.” University
of Massachusetts. Spring 2006. Available online at:
http://courses.umass.edu/resec262/documents/262Lecture13TransferableDischargePermits.pdf.
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market if MAC for all firms could be made equal, but this requires that the standards for
each firm be unique to that firm, implying prohibitively high administrative costs.
Moreover, a tradable permit program naturally achieves cost-effectiveness since each
firm emits at p0 = MAC. As a result, each firm is operating with the same MAC. In
addition, a permit trading scheme remains cost-effective over time as conditions within
the industry change, the number of permits is reduced, inflation changes money value,
and technological innovations reduce abatement costs. Because firms will always emit
where p0 = MAC, a cost-effective result is always achieved. For this reason, a permit
trading program may be preferable to an emissions tax in that the permit trading program
naturally adapts to changing conditions while an emissions tax would have to be
continually adjusted by policymakers. Indeed, Weitzman (1974) notes that under
uncertainty the distinction between a quantity-based approach (permit market) and a
price-based approach (tax) is irrelevant in “an infinitely flexible control environment
where the planners can continually adjust instruments to reflect current understanding of
a fluid situation and producers instantaneously respond…” In such a case he writes that
the determination of the approach should be left up to other factors. To be sure, these
other factors would likely include the administrative and compliance costs of continually
adjusting the price of carbon to meet a quantity target, which, given the Kyoto model, is a
likely scenario even if the eventual U.S. target is not as significant as it would be under
the Kyoto Protocol. Thus, a permit market regulated by a naturally adjusting price
appears superior to a CO2 tax.
Because the U.S. electric utility industry is responsible for 39 percent of national
anthropogenic CO2 emission, a CO2 permit trading scheme offers a cost-effective
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approach to reduce a lion’s share of domestic CO2 anthropogenic emissions. A number
of studies have examined the success of the SO2 trading scheme set up under the 1990
Clean Air Act Amendments. This paper extends much of this analysis to CO2, seeking to
calculate a shadow price proxy for CO2 abatement costs at the plant level. The shadow
price then enables a picture to develop of how different types of utilities would behave in
a CO2 permit market, total costs associated with reducing aggregate emissions to given
levels, and an analysis of whether a role exists for alternative fuels to play in reaching an
abatement target.

2.1 Acid Rain Program as a Model for CO2 Trading
The success of the Acid Rain Program under the 1990 Clean Air Act
Amendments has led to global interest in tradable emissions permits to curb greenhouse
gases. Kruger (2005) notes that private companies have begun setting voluntary CO2
emissions targets, some of which are designed to influence a national program. Nine
Mid-Atlantic and New England states have also developed a regional allowance trading
program, hoping to influence the design of a national trading program. In addition, the
European Union (EU) has implemented the largest greenhouse gas allowance trading
program to date. Kruger adds that as the “first mover,” the EU program could have
enormous influence on any international or domestic program.
The extensive literature examining the U.S. SO2 program has important
implications for the design of a CO2 trading program. Ellerman et al. (2000) report on
the history of trading programs, specifically the SO2 Acid Rain Program. While their
analysis focuses on the SO2 trading program they mention that emissions trading
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programs may work well for other types of emissions such as CO2. Carlson et al. (2000)
compare the SO2 trading program to a uniform emission rate standard among electricity
generating units. Their estimates suggest that, with the trading program, the electric
utility industry may ultimately save $700-$800 million (1995 dollars) per year in
abatement costs. However, retrospective analysis suggests that the gains from trade in
the first two years of the program were largely unrealized. They postulate that realized
gains from trade were lower than predicted for two main reasons. First, the price of lowsulfur coal was lower during the first years of the market than anticipated. This may be
because energy prices were also lower, reducing the cost of transporting coal and
effectively making it cheaper. Second, improvements in technology lowered the cost of
fuel switching. As a result, plants were able to rely more significantly on lower sulfur
coal than in recent years without any substantial equipment modifications, and other
plants willing to invest in new technology were able to more cheaply switch to lower SO2
emitting fuels such as natural gas. The authors note that fuel switching served as a major
abatement strategy for SO2 and suggest that it may serve to inform any potential CO2
abatement program.
Stavins (1998) states that the Acid Rain Program was so successful in reducing
emissions that after the first two years of implementation participating utilities had
“banked” more than six million tons. That is, emission levels fell well below set targets,
and these allowances could be saved for later use. Because the program allows for
banking, however, many of these permits may be utilized at some point in the future,
which will effectively reduce the long-term benefits that appear to have been realized in
the early years of the program. Additionally, a large number of permit purchasers could
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turn out to be speculators buying permits at low prices to sell once regulators tighten
emission targets. Stavins arrives at a somewhat different conclusion than Carlson et al.
(2000), writing, “Prospective analysis in 1990 suggested that the program's benefits
would approximately equal its costs (Portney, 1990), but recent analysis indicates that
benefits will exceed costs by a very significant margin (Burtraw, Krupnick, Mansur,
Austin and Farell, 1997).” Stavins also considers the political economy of the SO2
trading program, noting that it is the first break from the traditional command-and-control
strategies of previous environmental regulatory regimes. Stavins outlines a general
paradigm shift in the late 1980s of the political center, which now had a more favorable
view of market solutions to social problems. With the option of an emissions tax or a
tradable permit approach, environmental economists preferred the latter, as a tax makes
the costs of environmental compliance more visible to consumers, legislators, and firms.
Particularly if permits are given away for free, firms are better off with a permit system
than an emissions tax.
While the U.S. experience with SO2 trading yields relevant insights for the design
of a CO2 trading market, there are important differences between a market for SO2
emissions and CO2 emissions. Kruger (2005) summarizes the main findings of the
current literature comparing the two markets. Kruger recommends that many features of
the Acid Rain Program, such as banking of excess emissions reductions over time and
strong monitoring and enforcement provisions, should be included in any CO2 trading
program. However, Kruger also suggests some key modifications for a CO2 trading
program. For instance, SO2 is emitted primarily by coal-fired power plants. Sources of
CO2 emissions are diverse, consisting of anything that burns a fossil fuel. Kruger argues
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that instead of trying to regulate each smokestack, an ideal program would cover the
entire economy, possibly even regulating producers and refiners of fuels. Including
emissions from the transportation sector (affecting mobile sources) would also be
preferable and could be made possible by including refineries in the trading program
through the quality of fuel they produce.
Kruger continues, stating that most permits in the SO2 program are allocated free
of charge to utility plants. Under a CO2 program, he suggests that permits might be
auctioned to the highest bidder. Because the total value of the permits would be higher in
a CO2 program, this would make it possible to redistribute revenues from the auction or
allocate some allowances to energy consumers. Moreover, Kruger finds that a CO2
program should consider stabilizing allowance prices. This might entail a price ceiling
for permits, where the regulator would issue as many permits as the industry wishes to
purchase at a given price. This may be necessary considering many scholars believe that
CO2 prices will be more unpredictable than SO2 prices, and may be caused by the
relatively small number of mitigation options for CO2 and lack of cost-effective postcombustion controls. As long as the long-term trajectory of CO2 emissions is negative,
Kruger notes that a temporary increase in CO2 emissions is not of serious concern to most
scholars.

2.3 Predicted CO2 Permit Prices in the U.S. and Other Regions
A handful of studies have estimated CO2 marginal abatement costs for electric
power plants and/or estimated CO2 permit prices under a global or regional market. The
EIA International Energy Outlook 2005 estimates marginal abatement costs per metric
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ton for Canada, Japan, and Western Europe for varying levels of national reduction in
2010 and 2025. The results of this study are listed in Table 1. Several other studies have
estimated CO2 permit prices for the U.S. The main findings of these studies are included
in Table 2. Moreover, observed prices in the European Climate Exchange, the first
mandatory and geographically significant CO2 trading market have risen to about $30
currently from about $9 upon the opening of the market in January 2005. Sixty-five
corporate entities are participants in the market, with many able to sell permits to third
parties.

Table 1. Projected Carbon Emissions Marginal Abatement Costs for Selected
Countries and Regions that have Ratified the Kyoto Protocol 3

Country/Region

Emissions
Reduction
from 1990
Level

Projected Marginal
Abatement cost per
metric ton (2000 $)
2010

2025

Reduction
from
Domestic
Efforts 4

Reduction
from
Permit
Trading 5

Canada

6%

$26

$36

53.3 (25%)

177.8 (75%)

Japan

6%

$49

$43

70.1 (25%)

210.4 (75%)

Western Europe

8%

$48

$64

273 (50%)

273 (50%)

3

Energy Information Agency. International Energy Outlook 2005. “Energy-Related Carbon Dioxide
Emissions.” July 2005. Available online at: http://www.eia.doe.gov/oiaf/ieo/.
4
In percent and million metric tons.
5
In percent and million metric tons.
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Table 2. Estimates of U.S. CO2 Permit Prices (2000 $)

Organization
Congressional
Budget Office
Energy Information
Agency
World Resources
Institute

Emissions Target

Estimate of Permit
Price (Year)

Estimate of Permit
Price (Year)

1990 Emissions
Levels

$23 (2008)

$32 (2012)

57 and 224 million
metric tons by 2020

$50 (low estimate)

$68 (high estimate)

7 percent below
1990 Emissions
Levels

$30 (2010)

$40 (2010)

2.4 Calculating Shadow Prices
Several scholars have developed techniques, generally premised on linear
programming or Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) frameworks, to facilitate the
calculation of shadow prices for effluents. Färe et al. (1993) build a framework for
deriving shadow prices for undesirable outputs in the pulp and paper industry. The
authors employ duality theory to determine producer-specific shadow prices, using a
Shepard (1970) output distance function to define shadow prices for both good and bad
outputs. Their analysis demonstrates that shadow prices can effectively be calculated for
non-marketable outputs and note that determining the shadow prices of undesirable
outputs will verify whether or not emissions trading would be worthwhile.

Specifically,

Färe et al. utilize a parametric linear programming approach to model the output distance
function. Comparing the output distance function with the revenue function yields the
shadow price for each plant. This shadow price represents the opportunity cost in lost
electricity generation of reducing emissions by one ton. As a result, lost income from
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reduced electricity generation serves as a proxy for marginal abatement cost. Ultimately,
the authors suggest that if shadow prices equal marginal benefit to society of emission
abatement, then regulations are leading to an efficient allocation of resources. Moreover,
“if the marginal benefit of emission control is equal for all firms, then efficient regulation
would lead to equal shadow prices across firms.” Hetemaki (1995) uses a parametric
distance function to econometrically derive shadow prices. Hailu and Veeman (2000)
use a parametric distance function to generate efficiency measures and pollution
abatement costs. Following the framework laid out by Färe et al. (1993), they use this
model to calculate shadow prices for the Canadian pulp and paper industry.
Other papers have used similar frameworks to characterize SO2 abatement costs
for the electric utility industry. Coggins and Swinton (1996) utilize the Färe et al. (1993)
approach to calculate plant-specific SO2 shadow prices for a panel of Wisconsin coalburning power plants from 1990-1993. The authors find an average shadow price of
$292.70 per ton of SO2 for the panel, a price comparable to other shadow prices
calculated for the Midwest, but still higher than allowances traded in the early years of
the Acid Rain Program. Swinton (1998) expands upon this analysis by including coalburning plants in Wisconsin, Minnesota, and Illinois, and by including abatement
technology as an input. He finds that before SO2 trading began marginal abatement costs
varied widely across plants. Moreover, he also finds that plants with the highest
emissions rates also tend to have the lowest marginal abatement costs, perhaps explaining
the lower-than-anticipated prices for emissions allowances. Both of these studies utilize
a parametric linear programming approach to model the output distance function
described above.
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In a more recent analysis, Swinton (2002) calculated shadow prices for a panel of
Florida plants from 1990-1998. Again, the output distance function approach is used.
Observed transaction decisions are used to calculate plant-specific cost savings of SO2
trading. In some cases, cost savings appear to be negative. Yet Swinton finds that
enough heterogeneity exists in the industry for allowance trading to yield costs savings
for most plants, although he concludes that significant gains from trade have not
materialized. Färe et al. (2005) employ a quadratic directional output distance function
to test the efficiency of electric utilities and to calculate shadow prices before and after
Phase I of the Acid Rain Program. This approach is used with the understanding that it
has not been widely employed in other studies. The authors find that reducing
inefficiency within individual plants could reduce annual SO2 emissions by 4000-6000
tons. In addition, using the stochastic frontier method shadow SO2 prices are calculated
at $76/ton in 1993 and $142/ton in 1997, values consistent with actual market prices.
However, deterministic estimates of shadow prices are much higher, around $1100 in
1993 and $1973 in 1997. Thus, large gains in economic efficiency are possible through
allowance trading, though these gains will diminish over time and become increasingly
expensive as the output elasticity of substitution indicates that already efficient plants
have fewer substitution options. However, these results may be misleading since the
authors do not estimate separate models based on abatement capital.
Rezek and Blair (2005) utilize the Färe et al. (1993) output distance function
framework to calculate SO2 shadow prices for electric utility plants after Phase I of the
Acid Rain Program. Shadow prices are demonstrated to follow market outcomes, and the
variance of abatement costs decreased over time, suggesting a substantial decrease in

16

abatement cost heterogeneity. This finding is consistent with the efficient market
hypothesis, where marginal abatement costs are equal if the market is working efficiently.
In this study, the marginal abatement costs are not equal, but the decreasing variance over
time suggests that they at least seem to be converging.
Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) represents another approach to estimating
efficiency. DEA typically measures global efficiencies of production systems as revealed
through cross-sectional data. One advantage of DEA is that it is nonparametric, whereas
other approaches impose a possibly restrictive functional form. Moreover, DEA may
easily measure multi-output production systems, though Park and Lesourd (2000) reveal
that this is not a significant advantage over the duality approach followed in this paper.
DEA is a common method for estimating plant efficiency in the electric utility industry.
For instance, Pollitt (1996) examines an international sample of 78 nuclear power plants
both publicly and privately owned. Following the calculation of efficiency scores for
each plant using DEA, Tobit/OLS analysis is used to test the null hypothesis that
ownership has no effect on efficiency. The results suggest that the 13 UK plants in the
sample could stand to benefit at least marginally from lowered staffing levels.
Yaisawarng and Klein (1994) use DEA to develop a cumulative Malmquist inputbased productivity index for 61 coal-burning plants in the U.S. electric utility industry
from 1985-5989. They measure the efficiency of plants that must meet strict emissions
standards while also satisfying electricity demand. The Malmauist productivity change
index is then broken down into changes in plant efficiency, changes in scale efficiency,
and changes in technology. The analysis accounts for the inclusion of undesirable inputs
(sulfur) and undesirable outputs (SO2) in the process of producing a desirable output (net
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generation) using conventional inputs (labor, capital, fuel). Including desirable and
undesirable inputs in the analysis credits each plant’s ability to choose the best means of
meeting environmental control criteria. This allows for an unbiased measure of
productivity in an industry under environmental regulations. Aiken and Pasurka (2003)
use an output-based translog distance function to estimate shadow prices for PM-10 and
SO2 emissions for 19 industries in the U.S. manufacturing sector from 1970-1996.
Similar to Yaisawarng and Klein (1994), these shadow prices may be used to adjust
traditional total factor productivity growth indexes to account for the reallocation of
inputs from the production of desirable outputs to pollution abatement activities. This
adjusted measure of total factor production reveals that adjusted productivity for several
industries is actually much higher than the traditional measure of productivity.
Despite significant study of SO2 shadow prices, few scholars have ventured to
estimate CO2 shadow prices. Maradan and Vassiliev (2005) study how abatement costs
vary through different stages of a country’s economic development. CO2 shadow prices
are calculated for 76 developing and developed countries, and abatement costs are
deemed significantly higher for developing countries. Given growing interest in a
national CO2 trading market, the calculation of CO2 shadow prices in U.S. electric
utilities will provide insight into the likely price range of CO2 allowances, as well as help
identify what types of plants are more likely to buy or sell allowances in such a market.
It is important to note that the U.S. electric utility industry is only a large subset of CO2
emitters. However, given the administrative difficulties associated with a comprehensive
national carbon abatement strategy covering all sources as suggested by Kruger (2005), a
CO2 trading market for electric utilities may offer a relatively easier mechanism for
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quickly and substantially reducing domestic CO2 emissions. That is, an allowance
trading market might help pick the low-hanging fruit, buying more time to develop and
implement more complicated domestic and international CO2 abatement strategies.
In this study, I follow the techniques employed by several previous studies,
including Rezek and Blair (2005) and Färe et al. (1993), to calculate shadow prices for
electric utility plants. However, unlike these studies, this paper focuses on shadow prices
for CO2. The Färe et al. (1993) approach is chosen specifically for two several reasons.
First, it has been used extensively and is commonly accepted and, second, logical
constraints may be imposed upon shadow prices to more accurately reflect operating
conditions within the electric utility industry.

Section 3. Model for Calculating Shadow Prices

Following the model described by Rezek and Blair (2005) and Färe et al. (1993),
assume a given technology uses a set of x ∈ R+N inputs to produce a set of y ∈ R+M
outputs. Let the output set, P(x), be a closed, bounded, and convex set describing all
technically feasible output vectors. A subset of these outputs, y d ∈ R+D , will be defined as
“goods,” while the remaining outputs, y u ∈ R+U , will be defined as “bads.” As Färe et al.
(1993) suggest, a fundamental asymmetry exists between the good and bad outputs. That
is, goods may be rid of without cost, while bads may only be reduced by foregoing some
beneficial output or increasing abatement inputs. As an example, output set P(x),
illustrated in Figure 2, contains one good output and one bad output. Point A falls within
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the feasible set. The point on the horizontal axis directly below point A remains in the
feasible set, so the good is freely disposable, yet the point on the vertical axis to the left
of A is not included in the feasible output set, and so the bad is not freely disposable.

Figure 2. Output Distance Function 6

Shepard (1970) describes the technical relationship between inputs and outputs as
a mapping of a multiple-output, multiple-input production process onto a real line. The
resulting line is the output distance function, Do (x, y), which measures the minimum
scalar, θ , such that y / θ is within the feasible set:

(1)

Do ( x, y ) = min{θ : y / θ ∈ P( x)}

The output distance function measures the maximum potential radial output expansion
given observed inputs, shown as (OA/OA') in Figure 2. The distance function is equal to
one if and only if the observation is on the frontier of the output set P(x), while values
less than one indicate the presence of inefficiency or production on the interior of P(x).
6

Rezek and Blair (2005), p. 329
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This paper bases the yardstick of efficiency on observed data and therefore
ignores systematic inefficiency present in the electric utility industry. The output
distance function is a continuous function of x and y, is quasi-concave and nonincreasing
in x, and exhibits homogeneity of degree 1 in y. As in Rezek and Blair (2005), it is
assumed to be nondecreasing in yd and nonincreasing in yu. This implies that increased
production of goods increases efficiency but increased production of bads reduces
efficiency. The output distance function is also compatible with weak output
disposability, implying that a radial contraction of outputs is feasible with a given set of
inputs, or if y ∈ P(x) and θ ∈ [0,1] , then y θ ∈ P(x) . Because effluents may not be
eliminated without reducing some desirable output or increasing abatement inputs, weak
output disposability is a reasonable assumption in this context, making the output
distance function intuitively appealing.
Shephard (1970) shows that the output distance function is dual to the revenue
function under straightforward regularity conditions, implying

(2)

R ( x, p ) = sup{ py : Do ( x, y ) ≤ 1}
y

(3)

D ( x, p ) = sup{ py : R ( x, y ) ≤ 1} ,
p

where p is the vector of output prices. Färe et al. (1993) solves the LaGrangian implied
by Equation (2), yielding first-order conditions as given by

(4)

p = R( x, p) ∗ ∇D( x, y ) ,
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where ∇ is the gradient operator. By applying the envelope theorem to the dual
relationship given in Equation (3) and substituting the result into Equation (4), Färe et al.
(1993) show that

(5)

∇D( x, y ) = p * ( x, y ),

where p* is defined as the revenue maximizing output price vector or the revenuedeflated output shadow price. Therefore, the ratio of the derivatives of the distance
function with respect to the outputs yields the relative shadow prices. In the two-output
case:

(6)

∂D0 (⋅)
∂y u

∂D0 (⋅) pu*
= * .
∂y d
pd

Following Aigner and Chu's (1968) estimation procedure, restrictions can be placed on
the signs of these derivatives to allow asymmetric treatment of desirable and undesirable
outputs. Shadow prices of goods and bads are restricted to be nonnegative and
nonpositive, respectively, reflecting the assumptions that Do ( x, y ) is nondecreasing in yd,
and nonincreasing in yu. In the one-good, one-bad case, these restrictions act to impose a
positive slope on the hyperplane tangent to the output set P(x) in the region under
consideration. The slope of the hyperplane tangent to point A' in Figure 2 illustrates the
left-hand side of Equation (6).
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Solving Equation (6) for the shadow price of the undesirable output yields

(7)

⎡ ∂D (⋅)
pu* = p d* ⎢ 0
⎣ ∂y u

∂D0 (⋅) ⎤
⎥.
∂y d ⎦

To compute the implicit price of the bad, I follow Färe et al. (1993) and Rezek and Blair
(2005) in assuming that the shadow price of the desirable output equals its observed
price. As Rezek and Blair (p. 330) go on to state,
“In the context of the output distance function, with its dual relationship to the
revenue function, these shadow prices represent the marginal revenue associated
with an additional unit of abatement. The shadow prices of bads are reflective of
the marginal rate of transformation between the desirable and undesirable outputs
and, as such, represent the value of the electricity that is foregone when emissions
are reduced.”
As noted above, several previous studies employ this method to restrict effluent shadow
prices in the context of electricity production (Coggins and Swinton, 1996; Swinton,
1998, 2002) and pulp and paper production (Färe et al., 1993; Hailu and Veeman, 2000).
In this paper the output distance function is calculated by the translog
specification employed by Färe et al. (1993) and Rezek and Blair (2005):
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M

(8)

ln D( x, y ) = α 0 + ∑ α i (ln y i )
i =1

N

+ ∑ β j (ln x )
j =1

M

M

= ( 0 . 5) ∑ ∑ α ii ′
i =1 i ′ =1

× (ln y i )(ln y i′ )
N

N

+ ( 0 .5) ∑ ∑ β
j =1 j ′ =1

jj ′

× (ln x j )(ln x j ′ )
M

N

+ ∑ ∑ γ ij (ln y i )(ln x j )
i =1 j =1

where the α ii, β j, and γ ij are unknown parameters to be estimated. The Färe et al.
(1993) framework uses linear programming to solve for the combination of parameters
that yields the best-fit distance function given the observed input and output data. The
theoretical properties of the output distance function and the assumptions of the model
are incorporated into the linear program as constraints. As Färe et al. (1993) explain, this
functional form is flexible and does not impose strong disposability on outputs, making
this form particularly useful when calculating a shadow price. Thus, the following linear
program can be solved to determine observation-specific shadow prices:

K

(9)

max ∑ ln D( x k , y k )
α ,β , y

k =1

subject to
(10)

ln D( x k , y k ) ≤ 0

k = 1, … , K

(11)

∂ ln D( x k , y k ) / ∂ ln y dk ≥ 0

k = 1, … , K
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(12)

∂ ln D( x k , y k ) / ∂ ln y uk ≤ 0

k = 1, … , K

(13)

∂ ln D ( x k , y k ) / ∂ ln x k ≤ 0

k = 1, … , K

(14a)

∑α

i

=1

i

(14b)

∑α

ii ′

=0

i ′ = 1, … , M

=0

j = 1, … , N

i

(14c)

∑γ

ij

i

(15a) α ii′ = α i′i

i = 1, … , M, i ′ = 1, … M

(15b) β ii′ = β i′i

i = 1, … , M, i ′ = 1, … M

where the sample consists of K observations. As prescribed by Rezek and Blair (2005),
Equation (10) requires that each observation remain in the feasible set. Equations (11)
and (12) correspond to the assumptions of nonnegative and nonpositive shadow prices for
the desirable and undesirable outputs, respectively. Equation (13) requires that the output
distance function be nonincreasing in inputs. Equations (14a)-(14c) require the distance
function to be homogeneous of degree one in outputs. Finally, Equations (15a) and (15b)
impose symmetry on the interaction parameters of the translog functional form. These
restrictions reflect the assumptions made previously regarding the properties of the output
distance function and allow for the calculation of efficiency measures and the
computation of the accompanying shadow prices.
In order to calculate shadow prices for each observation, this paper expounds
upon Rezek and Blair’s Equation (7) such that derivatives from the log distance function
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can be used to calculate shadow prices. Beginning with Equation (7), the end result was
achieved as follows:

(7)

⎡ ∂D (⋅)
p u* = p d* ⎢ 0
⎣ ∂y u

∂D0 (⋅) ⎤
⎥
∂y d ⎦

(15)

(a)

∂D (⋅)
∂D (⋅) ∂ ln D0 (⋅) ∂ ln y u
=
⋅
⋅
∂y u
∂ ln D0 (⋅) ∂ ln y u
∂y u

(16)

(b)

∂D(⋅)
∂D(⋅) ∂ ln D0 (⋅) ∂ ln yd
=
⋅
⋅
∂yd
∂yd
∂ ln D0 (⋅) ∂ ln yd

Thus, substitution implies
(17)

Since

(18)

⎡⎛ ∂ ln D0 (⋅) ∂ ln y u
⋅
pu = p d ⎢⎜⎜
∂y u
⎣⎝ ∂ ln y u

⎞
⎟⎟
⎠

⎛ ∂ ln D0 (⋅) ∂ ln y d
⎜⎜
⋅
∂y d
⎝ ∂ ln y d

⎞⎤
⎟⎟⎥
⎠⎦

∂ ln yu
∂ ln yd
1
1
=
and
=
, then
∂yu
yu
∂yd
yd
⎡ ∂ ln D (⋅) ∂ ln y u
pu = p d ⎢
⎣ ∂ ln D (⋅) ∂ ln y d

⎤ yd
⎥⋅
⎦ yu

Section 4. Data

The computation of CO2 shadow prices is based on a sample of 518 electric
power plants (note: the sample includes both utilities and non-utilities) that emit CO2 in
the year 2000. Plants producing solely from nuclear, wind, hydro, etc., or a combination
of the above were thus excluded from the analysis. Data were obtained from a number of
sources containing both plant level (EPA eGrid 2000, EIA 2000 Form 423, and FERC
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Form 1) and utility level (EIA 2000 Form 861) data. Altogether, the plants included in
this study accounted for 1,953 millions tons or approximately 83% of total CO2
emissions from the electric utility industry in 2000 (EIA 2000). 7
Data on net electricity generation from fossil fuel sources only, total annual CO2
emissions, and nameplate capacity, or the maximum available generation capability, were
obtained from the EPA eGrid 2000 Database. In this study, nameplate capacity is used as
a proxy for capital (see Nemoto and Goto, 2003; Pollitt, 1996; Färe et al., 2005; Rezek
and Blair, 2005; etc.). Data on average heat content of fuels purchased were gathered
from EIA Form 423, and data on fuel consumption were taken from EIA Form 759. The
average number of employees, the measure of labor input, were obtained from FERC
Form 1 2000 and 2001 data along with EIA Form 412 2001 data. Data from a consistent
year, particularly 2000, would have been preferred but proved difficult to obtain.
Nevertheless, the average number of employees is assumed to remain fairly consistent
between years, and so the inclusion of 2001 data for some plants is not expected to
significantly alter the results. In addition, utilities reporting no employee number for any
plant in FERC Form 1 were excluded form the analysis under the assumption that the
“zeros” listed were not actual employee numbers. Likewise, cases where all plants for a
given utility have zero employees listed in EIA Form 412 were also excluded. It is
assumed that these reports are not accurate.
Rezek and Blair (2005) calculate a proxy for electricity price using revenue
earned by the utility from the sale of electricity divided by net electricity generated. This
calculation, however, does not account for instances where a plant purchases electricity
from another plant to sell to its own customers. To compensate for this, in this study the
7

http://www.eia.doe.gov/oiaf/1605/gg01rpt/carbon.html
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price of electricity generated at each plant, based on EIA Form 861, was assumed to be
equal to average revenue from all electricity sales divided by total electricity dispatched.
Specifically, a per unit “price” of electricity was calculated as resale and retail revenue
divided by total electricity dispatched, where resale revenue is defined as revenue
received for the sale of wholesale power to other electric utilities, for resale to others,
either electric utilities or retail consumers; and retail revenue is defined as revenue
received for the direct sale of energy to retail customers (this entry does not include
revenue for retail delivery services provided to customers who selected other energy
suppliers, as in “retail wheeling” programs in deregulated markets). Because revenue data
is only available at the utility level, it is assumed that each plant owned by a given utility
has the same price. The weighted average price of electricity in this study is 5.28 cents
per kilowatt hour, a figure slightly lower than the average revenue per kilowatt hour for
all fuel types observed in 2000 of 6.68 cents per kilowatt hour. Given that this paper only
includes facilities burning fossil fuels, which generally offer lower production costs, this
proxy appears reliable.
Plants are grouped according to fuel usage: coal and gas; coal and oil, no gas; and
gas, no coal. Because of the use of different technologies between these groups, the
distance function may not yield accurate estimates when based on an estimated model
using the entire sample. Thus, the distance function is calculated separately for each
group to measure efficiency only between plants using similar fuel technology. The
descriptive statistics for inputs, outputs, and electricity price are listed in Table 3.
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Table 3. Descriptive Statistics
Group 1
Coal and Gas

Group 2
Coal and Oil,
no Gas

Group 3
Gas, no Coal

Net Generation
(MWh)

3,670,928.90
3,793,318.30
(4,308,648.40) (3,697,727.59)

5,772,975.06
(5,232,201.88)

1,507,278.05
(2,060,349.52)

CO2 Emissions
(tons)

3,770,787.88
(4602681.05)

4,228,825.82
(4,063,388.40)

6,248,989.11
(5,513,794.60)

1,006,480.44
(1,233,095.18)

Nameplate Capacity
(MW)

788.80
(716.98)

798.55
(686.40)

1,011.06
(831.11)

562.21
(522.34)

Average Heat Input
(billion BTUs)

36,809.35
(42,664.54)

38,599.14
(38,084.7)

57,568.6
(51,823.98)

15,046.32
(18,073.78)

Electricity Price
(US$/MWh)

55.82
(15.19)

52.96
(11.73)

51.58
(12.29)

61.96
(17.72)

Employees

104.03
(97.94)

121.86
(77.01)

155.81
(118.63)

40.64
(28.63)

All Groups

Mean values.
Standard Deviation in parentheses.

Section 5. Results

Using the framework described in Section 3, the unknown parameters for the
output distance function given in Equation (8) are estimated and integrated with the input
and output data to yield plant-specific distance function values and shadow prices.
Premium Solver Platform 7 for Excel by Frontline System, Inc. is used to solve the linear
program. The average output distance function value for each group is listed in Table 4.
Overall, technical efficiency ranges from 0.03 to 1, indicating wide variation in
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efficiency. The mean indicates that, on average, plants are about 64 percent efficient.
Studies of U.S. plants with regard to SO2 emissions find relatively higher levels of
efficiency. Rezek and Blair (2005) report 83.5 percent efficiency, Coggins and Swinton
(1996) report 94.6 percent efficiency, and Färe et al. (2005) report 80.4 percent
efficiency. Note that these estimations are for U.S. electric power plants under the
mandatory Acid Rain Program. Because U.S. electric power plants may not necessarily
be trying to be efficient with regard to CO2 emissions, this could explain why estimated
efficiencies from this model are relatively low. The efficiency results suggest that plants
could enjoy significant cost savings, in lieu of a CO2 market, by altering its operations.

Table 4. Efficiency (D0)

Total

Group 1
Coal and Gas

Group 2
Coal and Oil,
no Gas

Group 3
Gas, no Coal

Mean

0.64

0.64

0.75

0.54

Minimum

0.03

0.18

0.10

0.03

Maximum

1

1

1

1

0.22

0.22

0.19

0.21

Std. Deviation

Using Equation (18) shadow prices are computed for each plant. The average
shadow prices for each group are reported in Table 5. Including plants from all groups,
the average shadow price is $39.97/ton.
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Table 5. CO2 Shadow Price Calculations ($/ton)

All Groups

Group 1
Coal and Gas

Group 2
Coal and Oil,
no Gas

Group 3
Gas, no Coal

39.97

53.95

50.67

20.09

Minimum

0

0

0

0

Maximum

467.97

388.42

467.97

343.05

Std. Deviation

55.58

48.85

66.84

39.87

Mean

For some plants the estimated shadow price was infinite. This was the case with
one plant in Group 1, one plant in Group 2, and one plant in Group 3. In these cases the
constraint that the derivative of the translog distance function with respect to the log of
net generation was zero or near zero. To compute estimated averages that are a better
representation of the true average, the shadow prices for these plants were assumed to be
equal to the highest finite price in the group. Keeping the infinite prices in the model
would distort the reported mean and decrease the usefulness of this model, and removing
them was deemed inappropriate. Thus, by keeping these values relatively high, they still
are significant within the model but do not distort it beyond usability. Ultimately,
estimates of CO2 market prices are not affected by this assumption, as the infinite costs
would only come into play under an implausible scenario whereby industry emissions are
driven to zero.
Based on these results, this paper discusses several implications for a CO2 trading
permit program in the U.S. electric utility industry. First, these shadow prices may be
used to construct an industry marginal abatement cost curve. Calculating the relevant
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area under the curve suggests how much given levels of CO2 abatement will cost.
Second, the variation in shadow prices between groups provides insight into what types
of plants would seek to purchase or sell permits; that is, how different types of plants
would be affected by a permit trading program. In addition, marginal abatement cost
curves can be constructed for each group. Finally, given targeted CO2 emissions
reductions levels, the increased cost of electricity production from fossil fuels due to
marginal abatement costs allows for comparison with different types of non-CO2 emitting
fuels (i.e. nuclear and hydroelectric) to determine if they are a cost-effective alternative
given the higher costs stemming from a CO2 permit market to reduce CO2 emissions.

5.1 CO2 Marginal Abatement Costs in the U.S. Electric Utility Industry
The calculation of shadow prices allows for the estimation of a lower-bound
industry marginal control cost curve. Under the assumption that plant-specific marginal
costs are equal to the shadow price across all levels of abatement, the costs of reducing
given levels of CO2 may be obtained. To illustrate this concept, assume the lowest
shadow price was $0.50 and this plant generates 1,000 tons. The cost for controlling each
ton up to 1000 would be $0.50 per ton. If the next lowest shadow price was $1 and this
plant generates 500 tons, the industry marginal cost for each of the next 500 tons would
be $1, and so on. Because plant marginal abatement costs are assumed to be constant, the
curve represents a lower bound industry MAC curve. It is likely that plant marginal
abatement costs are increasing, particularly for high levels of abatement. The lowerbound industry abatement cost curve is presented as Figure 3.
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Figure 3. Industry Marginal Abatement Cost
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In order to comply with the Kyoto Protocol, the U.S. would be expected to reduce
CO2 emissions to 7 percent below 1990 levels. Table 6 lists the levels of CO2 emissions
for 1990 and 2000 for the U.S. and Table 7 lists the levels of CO2 emissions specific to
the U.S. electric utility industry.
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Table 6. U.S. Anthropogenic Carbon Dioxide Emissions 8
Total National CO2 Emissions

(Million Metric Tons)

Estimated 2000 Emissions

5,806.1

Change Compared to 1999

174.8

Change from 1999 (percent)

3.1%

Estimated 1990 Emissions

4969.9

Change Compared to 1990

836.2

Change from 1990 (percent)

16.8%

Average Annual Increase, 1990-2000 (percent)

1.6%

7 Percent Below 1990 Emissions

4622.01

Required Reduction from 2000 National Emissions to
Meet Kyoto National Target

1184.09

Required Percent Reduction from 2000 National
Emissions to Meet National Kyoto Target

8

20.4%

Adapted from Emissions of Greenhouse Gases in the United States 2000: Carbon Dioxide. EIA. 2002.
Available online at: http://www.eia.doe.gov/oiaf/1605/gg01rpt/carbon.html.
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Table 7. Electric Utility Industry Carbon Dioxide Emissions 9
Total Electric Utility Industry CO2 Emissions
Electric Utility Industry 2000 Emissions (million
metric tons)

2,252.1

Electric Utility Industry 1990 Emissions (million
metric tons)

1,790.3

Industry Change Compared to 1990 (million metric
tons)

461.8

Change from 1990 (percent)

25.8%

7 Percent Below 1990 Industry Emissions

1664.98

Required Reduction from 2000 Industry Emissions to
Meet Proportional Kyoto Target (million metric tons)

587.12

Required Percent Reduction from 2000 Industry
Emissions to Meet Proportional Kyoto Target

26.1%

Because the electric utility industry is responsible for 39 percent of CO2 emissions
in 2000, making it the largest single source of CO2, it is likely that any reduction program
would require the industry to reduce emissions beyond its proportional share of total
emissions. That is, given the relatively small number of emissions sources, it would be
much easier to regulate the electric utility industry than the transportation sector, the next
largest contributor of domestic CO2 emissions at 33 percent (EIA 2005). Thus, for
example, under the rubric of the Kyoto Protocol, the industry would likely be responsible
for reducing somewhere between 587.12 million metric tons (7 percent below the
industry’s 1990 emissions levels) and 1,184.09 million metric tons (7 percent below

9

Adapted from EPA Inventory of U.S. Greenhouse Gas Emissions and Sinks: 1990-2003, Chapter 3:
Energy. EPA. 2005. Available online at
http://yosemite.epa.gov/oar/globalwarming.nsf/UniqueKeyLookup/RAMR69V4ZT/$File/05energy.pdf.
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national 1990 emissions levels). Subsequently, this paper presents two major scenarios
of reduction targets to predict industry marginal abatement costs and, hence, the market
permit price for one ton of CO2. The first scenario, labeled the “Kyoto Protocol
Scenario” (KPS), entails meeting the Kyoto target of 7 percent below 1990 emissions
levels. The second scenario, labeled the “1990 Level Scenario” (1990S), entails reducing
2000 emissions to 1990 levels, a proposal made by several in Washington, DC. Further,
the following analysis presents upper bound (UB) and lower bound (LB) CO2 permit
price estimates under the two scenarios. The upper bound estimation assumes that the
electric utility industry will be the sole sector responsible for meeting emissions targets
under both scenarios. The lower bound estimation assumes that the electric utility
industry will only be responsible for reducing its proportional share of national emissions
and not compensating for any other sectors to meet the targets of both scenarios. The
actual industry target for any CO2 abatement program would likely fall between these
bounds, as the electric utility industry would likely object to bearing the full burden of
abatement while the relatively small number of emissions sources reduce the
administration and compliance costs of an abatement program. As a result, the upper and
lower bounds presented in this analysis are merely suggested reference points given
varying potential abatement targets. Tables 8 and 9 present the estimations from these
scenarios.
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Table 8. Upper and Lower Bound Estimates of a Permit Price under the Kyoto
Protocol Scenario (KPS)
Lower Bound

Upper Bound

Total Reduction (million
metric tons)

587.12

1184.09

Estimated Permit Price
($/ton)

30.70

48.48

Total Abatement Cost

$10,930,957,788

$34,275,114,659

Table 9. Upper and Lower Bound Estimates of a Permit Price under the 1990 Level
Scenario (1990S)
Lower Bound

Upper Bound

Total Reduction (million
metric tons)

461.8

836.2

Estimated Permit Price
($/ton)

27.00

37.40

Total Abatement Cost

$7,281,583,636

$18,735,865,331

Thus, if a domestic permit program were implemented to comply with the Kyoto target,
the likely resulting permit price would lie somewhere between $30.70/ton and
$48.48/ton. Table 10 presents estimates of permit price and total average cost for
increments between these bounds. These values, including those estimated for the two
scenarios, are further analyzed in section 5.3.
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Table 10. Permit Price and Total Average Cost Estimates
Quantity of
Reduction (million
metric tons)

Percent Reduction
from Total
Industry Emissions

Permit Price
($/ton)

Total Abatement
Cost (TAC)

500

22.2%

27.90

$8,429,311,089

600

26.6%

30.80

$11,077,165,127

700

31.1%

32.90

$14,118,104,555

800

35.5%

35.80

$17,554,110,196

900

40.0%

39.50

$21,979,919,622

1,000

44.4%

42.10

$25,174,073,027

1,100

48.8%

46.60

$30,282,864,559

5.2 Behavioral Response to a CO2 Permit Trading Program by Group
The average CO2 shadow price among all plants is $39.97/ton. However, the
shadow prices do differ between the three groups. Group 1 (coal and gas) plants have an
average shadow price of $53.95/ton, Group 2 (coal and oil, no gas) plants have an
average price of $50.67/ton, and Group 3 (gas, no coal) averages $20.09/ton. This
suggests that, on average, plants burning natural gas face significantly smaller costs in
reducing CO2 emissions on the margin. If a CO2 permit trading program were
established, Group 3 plants would likely benefit from the sale of permits, as many firms
could substantially reduce CO2 emissions for less than the market price of a permit.
However, a comparison of all three groups’ marginal abatement cost curves, depicted in
Figure 4, reveals an important caveat.
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Figure 4. Comparison of Group-Specific Marginal Abatement Cost Curves
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As Table 11 illustrates below, Group 3 plants make up only 15.38 percent of net
generation and account for only 9.99% of total emissions in the sample. This implies that
as the abatement increases, the percent of total production affected by abatement
strategies rises disproportionately for Group 3 plants relative to the other groups.
Ultimately, as the number of tons to be reduced approaches 200 million, further reduction
essentially becomes cost-prohibitive.
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Table 11. Percentage of Net Generation in Sample and CO2 Emissions by Group
Percent of Net
Percent of CO2
Net Generation
CO2 Emissions
Generation in
Emissions in
Group
(MWh)
(tons)
Sample
Sample
Group 1: Coal
and Gas

500,718,015

26.33%

558,205,007.5

28.58%

Group 2: Coal
and Oil, no Gas

1,108,411,211

58.29%

1,199,805,908

61.43%

292,411,942

15.38%

195,257,205.8

9.99%

1,901,541,169

100%

1,953,268,122

100%

Group 3: Gas,
no Coal
Total

The share of total emissions and net generation suggests that the total abatement quantity
may influence group behavior under a tradable permit program. Because all three groups
would share in the reduction effort, no one group would be in danger of approaching its
limit. Thus, Group 3 plants, with a lower average shadow price, are likely to sell permits
to Groups 1 and 2, both with significantly higher average shadow prices. Furthermore,
the EPA reports that coal contains the highest amount of carbon per unit of energy, while
petroleum has about 25 percent less carbon than coal, and natural gas about 45 percent
less (EPA 2001). Where possible, some plants might switch from coal or petroleum to
burn natural gas. This could dramatically reduce a plant’s CO2 emissions, though the
cost would vary depending on new levels of demand for natural gas. Thus, a plantspecific study accounting for each plant’s ability to switch fuels and estimate natural gas
prices based on market conditions would prove valuable in determining how significant
fuel switching can be in CO2 reductions. Ultimately, though, the results of this paper
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indicate that Group 3 plants stand to benefit the most from a tradable permit program
while Group 1 and 2 plants may be at a relative disadvantage.

5.3 Influence of Marginal Abatement Costs on Fuel Choice
Given the increased cost in generation from an abatement level, fossil fuel
technologies may be compared with non-greenhouse gas emitting technologies to
compare for cost-effectiveness in achieving the targeted CO2 emissions reduction.
Specifically, dividing total abatement cost by total net electricity generation yields the
cost of abatement in dollar per kilowatt terms. To obtain specific costs for coal and
natural gas, this is done using estimates for Group 2 and 3 plants, respectively. These
abatement costs can then be added to current levelized costs of fossil fuel electricity
generation to estimate new levelized fuel costs under a CO2 trading program with a
targeted level of emissions. A levelized electricity generation cost is estimated as a
function of capital cost, fuel cost, operation and maintenance costs, and other costs over
the lifetime of a power plant, usually 30 years. Levelized costs by fuel technology were
obtained from the 1996 Energy Technology Status Report published by the California
Energy Commission and are reported in Table 12. Note that these figures are adjusted
from 1993 constant dollars to 2000 dollars using CPI. Increased cost from given levels of
abatement for plants in Groups 2 and 3 are reported in Table 13.
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Table 12. Levelized Cost of Electricity Generation Technologies 10

Fuel Type

Levelized Cost Per Kilowatt Hour
(cents/kWh adjusted for 2000 $)

Natural Gas (conventional combined cycle)

4.14-4.62

Coal (pulverized)

4.02-4.62

Nuclear (pressurized water reactor)

6.63-9.23

Geothermal (vapor-dominated resource)

4.26-7.56

Hydroelectric (conventional)

3.24-6.63

Biomass (direct combustion)

6.15-11.72

Municipal Solid Waste (mass burn)

1.76-4.02

Wind (utility scale)

4.02

Solar Thermal (parabolic trough)

7.46-8.76

10

Adapted from 1996 Energy Technology Status Report. California Energy Commission. Dec. 1997.
Costs are “levelized over a typical lifetime (30 years) beginning in 2000.” All costs are for publicly owned
utilities and are adjusted from 1993 constant dollars to 2000 dollars using CPI. Report available online at:
http://www.energy.ca.gov/etsr/9704ETSR.PDF.
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Table 13. Increased Cost for Given Levels of Abatement (Cents/kWh)

Million CO2 Tons
Reduced

Cost Increase
for Coal

New Levelized
Coal Cost

Cost Increase
for Natural
Gas

New Levelized
Natural Gas
Cost

461.8 (1990S, LB)

0.21

4.23

0.58

4.72

500

0.25

4.27

0.64

4.78

587.12 (KPS, LB)

0.36

4.38

0.69

4.83

600

0.38

4.40

0.69

4.83

700

0.50

4.52

0.72

4.86

800

0.64

4.66

0.73

4.87

836.2 (1990S, UB)

0.73

4.75

0.76

4.90

900

0.89

4.91

0.81

4.95

1,000

1.10

5.12

0.82

4.96

1,100

1.28

5.30

0.86

5.00

1184.09 (KPS,
UB)

1.54

5.56

0.98

5.12

Both the baseline and new levelized costs for coal (Figure 3) and natural gas
(Figure 4) are compared with currently available fuel technologies at various abatement
targets. In both cases, coal and natural gas remain competitive at relatively low levels of
abatement. Assuming that each technology is pursed with the greatest possible
efficiency, the lower bound estimates of levelized costs for each fuel type listed in Table
12 are used in Figures 5 and 6. Comparing levelized costs of coal and natural gas at
increasing increments of abatement reveals that some options such as hydroelectric,
wind, and geothermal may present cost-effective alternatives to fossil fuels under a CO2
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reduction program. Despite its low levelized cost, municipal solid waste involves
combustion, thus releasing CO2, and therefore may not be a preferable alternative.
Ultimately, these findings reveal that pursing non-CO2 emitting energy technologies will
likely be a part of a cost-effective CO2 mitigation strategy.
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Figure 5. Comparison of Abatement and Technology Options for Coal Levelized
Costs

Level of Abatement (MMT) or
Technology Option
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Figure 6. Comparison of Abatement and Technology Options for Natural Gas
Levelized Costs
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Figure 7 compares increased levelized costs of producing coal and natural gas at
increasing levels of CO2 abatement. For lower levels of abatement, coal remains cheaper
per kWh than natural gas. However, for extremely high levels of abatement, particularly
as the abatement target approaches the upper bound of Scenario 1, natural gas proves to
be cheaper per kWh. Note that since 2000 natural gas fuel prices have increased
dramatically, so these results may be different provided more current data. Nevertheless,
these results suggest that coal remains a viable energy source compared to natural gas for
low to moderate levels of CO2 abatement despite the significant difference in shadow
prices between Groups 2 and 3.
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Figure 7. Comparison of Coal and Natural Gas Levelized Costs for Given Levels of
CO2 Abatement
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Section 6. Conclusions

In contrast to SO2, CO2 is a globally mixing gas. Whereas domestic efforts to
reduce SO2 emissions can have a substantial impact on air quality, domestic efforts to
reduce CO2 emissions will alone not be enough to substantially influence global climate
change. Thus, a global CO2 permit trading market is the optimal policy instrument to
curb global climate change, not a national or regional effort. Comparing the shadow
prices estimated by this paper with the predicted MAC per ton of CO2 for Canada, Japan,
and Western Europe (though for the year 2010) from the EIA International Energy
Outlook 2005 (Table 1), it appears the U.S. would likely fall somewhere in between
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Canada and Western Europe. Still, even in an international market, transactions occur
between permit holders and not between countries. Thus, any study attempting to
analyze an international CO2permit market must obtain international data on individual
power plants. This data is available, though it usually must be obtained through private
companies and is typically quite expensive. Nevertheless, should the U.S. choose to
participate in such an international market, an understanding of the marginal abatement
cost structures of U.S. electric power plants provides considerable insight into how this
market will affect these firms. Moreover, there are sure to be real concerns regarding the
national cost of participating in such a program, inviting further discussion on the most
cost-effective means of achieving the stated emissions target.
Using a parametric distance function approach, this paper found an average
shadow price of 39.97 $/ton for the U.S. electric utility industry, a figure consistent with
other calculations of CO2 shadow prices. These shadow prices were used to construct
industry and technology-specific marginal abatement cost curves to determine the costs
associated with varying levels of CO2 reductions. In particular, two potential scenarios
were studied. One scenario estimated permit prices and total abatement cost of following
the Kyoto Protocol and reducing national CO2 emissions to 7 percent below 1990 levels.
The other estimated a permit price and total abatement cost of reducing national CO2
emissions to 1990 levels. Under each scenario, an upper bound estimate was generated
under the assumption that the electric utility industry would be the sole sector responsible
for meeting the targeted reduction. A lower bound estimate was then generated under the
assumption that the industry would only be responsible for reducing its proportional share
of total CO2 emissions. It is likely that any effort to reduce domestic CO2 emissions
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would call on the electric utility industry to fall somewhere in between these estimates.
Under the Kyoto scenario, a permit price is estimated to be between 30.70 and 48.48
$/ton with a total cost between $10.93 billion and $34.28 billion. Under the 1990 level
scenario, a permit price is estimated to be between 27.00 and 37.40 $/ton with a total cost
between $7.28 billion and $18.74 billion. Incremental permit prices and total average
costs were subsequently estimated between these values.
Behavioral responses of different types of plants were also considered given
varying shadow prices between technological groups. The results reveal that plants
employing mostly natural gas generating units will likely benefit the most from a permit
trading program, or at least would incur the least costs, as they have significantly lower
abatement costs than plants that primarily rely on coal or rely on both coal and natural
gas. This is likely a result of the fuel since natural gas contains about 45 percent less
carbon per unit of energy than coal. Also, coal and natural gas appear to have similar
input costs per unit of electricity. Thus, fuel switching could prove to be a significant
component of a CO2 emissions reduction strategy. Further research may provide
valuable insight into how large of a role fuel switching may play in meeting CO2
emissions reductions targets, particularly since natural gas prices have increased
substantially since 2000.
Indeed, given the relatively small number of studies focusing on CO2 shadow
prices, benefits from further research may potentially be substantial. For example, with
Group 3 plants only composing a small portion of overall net generation and CO2
emissions, and with this group being most likely to sell permits to plants in other groups,
the overall impact that Group 3 permits could have on the overall market is not well
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understood. In addition, the marginal abatement costs curves constructed for this paper
only offer a lower bound estimate. A more exact industry cost curve would provide more
precise information on potential costs faced by the electric utility industry when reducing
CO2 emissions by a given quantity. Furthermore, this would also allow for a more
accurate assessment of cost-effectiveness by fuel type to meet emissions targets.
Finally, the total costs of implementing a CO2 permit trading program were
factored into current electricity fossil fuel prices by type and compared with prices of
other fuel types, allowing for a comparison of cost-effectiveness in meeting prescribed
emissions reduction targets. For lower levels of abatement between the lower and upper
bounds of both scenarios, the price of fossil fuel energy is relatively competitive.
However, higher levels of abatement suggest that alternative non-emitting energy sources
may provide significant cost relief in meeting emissions reduction targets. Still, the exact
role alternative energy sources will play in reducing CO2 emissions is beyond the scope
of this paper, but the results suggest there is likely a role to play.
In estimating CO2 shadow prices for electric power plants in the U.S., this paper
lends insight into how a CO2 permit trading market might take shape in the U.S. and how
much total abatement will cost, and suggests that alternative energy sources can likely
reduce the overall costs of a large-scale abatement strategy. Specifically, the estimated
shadow price for each plant allows for the estimation of total costs, prediction of plant
behavior under a CO2 market, and comparison with other energy sources for a test of
cost-effectiveness. Given a relatively small number of studies on CO2 shadow prices,
this paper provides a good first step in exploring the areas discussed. However, as
mentioned above, further research on this hot topic, extending this analysis, will better
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enhance the development of a sound national, and perhaps international CO2 abatement
strategy.
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